3 papers
cs.GT2026
Random Serial Dictatorship is -Envy-Free
Frank Connor, Max Dupré la Tour, Louis-Roy Langevin +4
We analyze the house allocation problem, in which a set of agents must be matched to a set of objects for which they have cardinal utilities. A central mechanism for this problem i…
cs.GT2026
Tight Asymptotic Bounds for Fair Division With Externalities
Frank Connor, Max Dupré la Tour, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive posit…
cs.GT2025
The Popular Dimension of Matchings
Frank Connor, Louis-Roy Langevin, Ndiamé Ndiaye +3
We study popular matchings in three classical settings: the house allocation problem, the marriage problem, and the roommates problem. In the popular matching problem, (a subset of…