5 papers
Dynamic Test Design
Doruk Cetemen, Francesc Dilmé
We study dynamic test design under the threat of manipulation. At each instant, a principal who cannot commit to future actions chooses whether to hire an agent, fire him, or conti…
Optimal Project Management
Alessandro Bonatti, Doruk Cetemen, Juuso Toikka
We study optimal dynamic contracts for long-term projects where a risk-averse agent exerts hidden effort to increase the drift of a Brownian process toward a com- pletion threshold…
AI and the Market for Signals
Doruk Cetemen, Emre Ozdenoren
Early-career work both signals a worker's ability and builds long-run skills. We introduce an AI industry into a career signaling model. The industry sells tokens, which workers co…
Midterm Review
Doruk Cetemen, Yonggyun Kim, Fei Li +1
We study why organizations conduct interim performance reviews when monetary rewards are limited. An interim review creates incentive capacity by allowing future work and career op…
Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves
Doruk Cetemen, Can Urgun, Leeat Yariv
We study a model of collective search by teams. Discoveries beget discoveries and correlated search results are governed by a Brownian path. Search results' variation at any point…