13 citations · 26 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Computing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Sequential Auctions with Verification
Vinzenz Thoma, Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
We present an algorithm for computing pure-strategy epsilon-perfect Bayesian equilibria in sequential auctions with continuous action and value spaces. Importantly, our algorithm i…
Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
Vitor Bosshard, Ye Wang, Sven Seuken
Combinatorial auctions are used to allocate resources in domains where bidders have complex preferences over bundles of goods. However, the behavior of bidders under different paym…
Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules
Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
In this research note, we lay some groundwork for analyzing the manipulability of core-selecting payment rules in combinatorial auctions. In particular, we focus on payment rules b…
The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions
Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
We study a class of manipulations in combinatorial auctions where bidders fundamentally misrepresent what goods they are interested in. Prior work has largely assumed that bidders…
Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
Vitor Bosshard, Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin +1
We present a new algorithm for computing pure-strategy -Bayes-Nash equilibria (-BNEs) in combinatorial auctions with continuous value and action spaces. A…