3 papers
econ.TH2026
Extreme Equilibria: The Benefits of Correlation
Kirill Rudov, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Leeat Yariv
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved withi…
econ.TH2021
Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information
Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Kirill Rudov, Leeat Yariv
We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We…
econ.TH2021
Dominance Solvability in Random Games
Noga Alon, Kirill Rudov, Leeat Yariv
We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination of strictly-dominated actions in random games. We show that dominance solvability of games is vanishingly small as the number of…