3 papers
cs.AI2026
From Admission to Invariants: Measuring Deviation in Delegated Agent Systems
Marcelo Fernandez
Autonomous agent systems are governed by enforcement mechanisms that flag hard constraint violations at runtime. The Agent Control Protocol identifies a structural limit of such sy…
cs.LO2026
Atomic Decision Boundaries: A Structural Requirement for Guaranteeing Execution-Time Admissibility in Autonomous Systems
Marcelo Fernandez
Autonomous systems increasingly execute actions that directly modify shared state, creating an urgent need for precise control over which transitions are permitted to occur. Existi…
econ.TH2021
Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information
Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Kirill Rudov, Leeat Yariv
We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We…