activity
20212026
most citedRegret-free truth-telling voting rules

1 citations · 1 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

5 papers

cs.CR2026

Identity-Bound Governance Under Execution Uncertainty: An Accountability Proof Block for LLM Agent Persistent Halts, with Cryptographic Implementation and Cross-Model Calibration

Marcelo Fernandez

A correctly governed LLM agent can reach a state in which neither continuing execution nor automatically halting is admissible: the system has detected a persistent failure of its…

cs.AI2026

From Admission to Invariants: Measuring Deviation in Delegated Agent Systems

Marcelo Fernandez

Autonomous agent systems are governed by enforcement mechanisms that flag hard constraint violations at runtime. The Agent Control Protocol identifies a structural limit of such sy…

cs.LO2026

Atomic Decision Boundaries: A Structural Requirement for Guaranteeing Execution-Time Admissibility in Autonomous Systems

Marcelo Fernandez

Autonomous systems increasingly execute actions that directly modify shared state, creating an urgent need for precise control over which transitions are permitted to occur. Existi…

econ.TH2022★ 1 cited

Regret-free truth-telling voting rules

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustin G. Bonifacio, Marcelo Ariel Fernandez

We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free t…

econ.TH2021

Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Kirill Rudov, Leeat Yariv

We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We…