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20212026
most citedRobust Algorithmic Collusion

12 citations · 12 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

7 papers

econ.TH2026

Auditing Algorithmic Collusion from Strategy Graphs

Nicolas Eschenbaum, Janusz M. Meylahn

Detecting algorithmic collusion is challenging because regulators often have limited access to firms' algorithms, training data, and market information. We study an intermediate-in…

econ.GN2026

Shared Bidding Algorithms and Competition: Evidence from Electricity Markets

Nicolas Eschenbaum

Competing firms increasingly delegate market decisions to algorithms supplied by the same third-party providers. We study whether a shared algorithm leads competitors to internalis…

econ.GN2026

Market Power and Platform Design in Decentralized Electricity Trading

Nicolas Eschenbaum, Nicolas Greber

This paper studies how platform design shapes strategic behavior in decentralized electricity trading. We develop a finite-horizon dynamic game in which photovoltaic- and battery-e…

econ.TH2025

Repeated Auctions with Speculators: Arbitrage Incentives and Forks in DAOs

Nicolas Eschenbaum, Nicolas Greber

We analyze the vulnerability of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) to speculative exploitation via their redemption mechanisms. Studying a game-theoretic model of repeat…

econ.GN2022★ 12 cited

Robust Algorithmic Collusion

Nicolas Eschenbaum, Filip Mellgren, Philipp Zahn

This paper develops a formal framework to assess policies of learning algorithms in economic games. We investigate whether reinforcement-learning agents with collusive pricing poli…

econ.GN2021

Dynamic Monopoly Pricing With Multiple Varieties: Trading Up

Stefan Buehler, Nicolas Eschenbaum, Severin Lenhard

This paper studies dynamic monopoly pricing for a broad class of settings that allow for multiple durable, multiple rental, or a mix of varieties. We show that the driving force be…

econ.GN2021

Dealing with Uncertainty: The Value of Reputation in the Absence of Legal Institutions

Nicolas Eschenbaum, Helge Liebert

This paper studies reputation in the online market for illegal drugs in which no legal institutions exist to alleviate uncertainty. Trade takes place on platforms that offer rating…