1 citations · 3 across the 21 of their papers we have counts for
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Delegated Fair Division
Argyrios Deligkas, Michail Fasoulakis, Stavros D. Ioannidis +2
Motivated by recently introduced problems on delegated resource allocation, we study a model of fair division, where a set of indivisible goods is to be allocated to some agents, e…
Network Allocation Games with Anonymous Preferences
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Šimon Schierreich +1
We study network allocation games in which a set of agents must be allocated to (a subset of) the vertices of a graph topology. The agents are anonymous and strategic: Each of them…
Stability in Distance Preservation Games on Graphs
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Tiger-Lily Goldsmith +2
We introduce a new class of network allocation games called graphical distance preservation games. Here, we are given a graph, called a topology, and a set of agents that need to b…
Public Goods Games in Directed Networks with Constraints on Sharing
Argyrios Deligkas, Gregory Gutin, Mark Jones +2
In a public goods game, every player chooses whether or not to buy a good that all neighboring players will have access to. We consider a setting in which the good is indivisible,…
Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Sophie Klumper +2
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some a…
Balanced and Fair Partitioning of Friends
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Stavros D. Ioannidis +2
In the recently introduced model of fair partitioning of friends, there is a set of agents located on the vertices of an underlying graph that indicates the friendships between the…
The Complexity of Extending Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Robert Ganian +2
We initiate the study of computing envy-free allocations of indivisible items in the extension setting, i.e., when some part of the allocation is fixed and the task is to allocate…
EF1 and EFX Orientations
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Tiger-Lily Goldsmith +1
We study the problem of finding fair allocations -- EF1 and EFX -- of indivisible goods with orientations. In an orientation, every agent gets items from their own predetermined se…
Individual Rationality in Topological Distance Games is Surprisingly Hard
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Dušan Knop +1
In the recently introduced topological distance games, strategic agents need to be assigned to a subset of vertices of a topology. In the assignment, the utility of an agent depend…
The Complexity of Fair Division of Indivisible Items with Externalities
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Viktoriia Korchemna +1
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent g…
Complexity of Efficient Outcomes in Binary-Action Polymatrix Games with Implications for Coordination Problems
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Gregory Gutin +2
We investigate the difficulty of finding economically efficient solutions to coordination problems on graphs. Our work focuses on two forms of coordination problem: pure-coordinati…