6 papers
A Case for Competition in Information Provision
Bianca Sanesi, Federico Vaccari
We study how competition among biased news sources affects information and welfare when sources can misrepresent facts at a cost. Monopolistic and competitive market structures adm…
Shadow-score auctions for execution incentives
Federico Vaccari
This paper studies optimal auctions in which the allocation creates a moral hazard problem for a third-party executor. The executor chooses effort before the winner is known. In re…
Market tallies: minimal information for efficient trade
Federico Vaccari
This paper studies how much public information is needed to implement efficient trade in dynamic markets with privately informed sellers and buyers. An institution compares a certi…
Belief patterns with information processing
Federico Vaccari
This paper presents a model of costly information acquisition where decision-makers can choose whether to elaborate information superficially or precisely. The former action is cos…
The Unelected Hand? Bureaucratic Influence and Electoral Accountability
Simon Lodato, Christos Mavridis, Federico Vaccari
What role do non-elected bureaucrats play when elections provide imperfect accountability and create incentives for pandering? We develop a model where politicians and bureaucrats…
Influential News and Policy-making
Federico Vaccari
It is believed that interventions that change the media's costs of misreporting can increase the information provided by media outlets. This paper analyzes the validity of this cla…