4 citations · 8 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
Stable matching under regulation
Chao Huang
In a market in which any coalition can reach agreements, a stable outcome need not exist even when agents have substitutable preferences. We show how regulation can restore stabili…
Matching to two sides
Chao Huang
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demon…
A dynamic auction for multilateral collaboration
Chao Huang
We study the problem of multilateral collaboration among agents with transferable utilities. Any group of agents can sign a contract consisting of a primitive contract and monetary…
Multilateral matching with scale economies
Chao Huang
This paper studies multilateral matching in which agents may negotiate contracts within any coalition. We assume scale economies such that an agent substitutes some existing contra…
Concave many-to-one matching
Chao Huang
We propose a notion of concavity in two-sided many-to-one matching, which is an analogue to the balancedness condition in cooperative games. A stable matching exists when the marke…
Firm-worker hypergraphs
Chao Huang
A firm-worker hypergraph consists of edges in which each edge joins a firm and its possible employees. We show that a stable matching exists in both many-to-one matching with trans…
Two-sided matching with firms' complementary preferences
Chao Huang
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a…
Unidirectional substitutes and complements
Chao Huang
In discrete matching markets, substitutes and complements can be unidirectional between two groups of workers when members of one group are more important or competent than those o…
Stable matching: an integer programming approach
Chao Huang
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisib…