activity
20192026
most citedRelative Maximum Likelihood Updating of Ambiguous Beliefs

19 citations · 19 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

9 papers

econ.TH2026

Secret Communication with Plausible Deniability

Xiaoyu Cheng, Yonggyun Kim, Michael P. H. Tam

Communication is secret if a message is independent of the state; however, the receiver's subsequent action may still reveal that she has acted on hidden information. This paper st…

econ.TH2025

Ambiguous Persuasion with Prior Ambiguity

Xiaoyu Cheng

Cheng (2025) establishes that in a persuasion game where both the sender and the receiver have Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences, the sender never strictly benefits from us…

econ.TH2024

On the Monotonicity of Information Costs

Xiaoyu Cheng, Yonggyun Kim

We study the monotonicity of information costs: more informative experiments must be more costly. As criteria for informativeness, we consider the standard information orders intro…

econ.TH2023

Improving Robust Decisions with Data

Xiaoyu Cheng

A decision-maker faces uncertainty governed by a data-generating process (DGP), which is only known to belong to a set of sequences of independent but possibly non-identical distri…

econ.TH2022

Robust Data-Driven Decisions Under Model Uncertainty

Xiaoyu Cheng

When sample data are governed by an unknown sequence of independent but possibly non-identical distributions, the data-generating process (DGP) in general cannot be perfectly ident…

econ.TH2021

Extended Relative Maximum Likelihood Updating of Choquet Beliefs

Xiaoyu Cheng

Cheng(2021) proposes and characterizes Relative Maximum Likelihood (RML) updating rule when the ambiguous beliefs are represented by a set of priors. Relatedly, this note proposes…

econ.TH2021

A Concavification Approach to Ambiguous Persuasion

Xiaoyu Cheng

This note shows that the value of ambiguous persuasion characterized in Beauchene, Li and Li(2019) can be given by a concavification program as in Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and…

econ.TH2020

Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation

Xiaoyu Cheng

Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information…

econ.TH2019★ 19 cited

Relative Maximum Likelihood Updating of Ambiguous Beliefs

Xiaoyu Cheng

This paper proposes and axiomatizes a new updating rule: Relative Maximum Likelihood (RML) for ambiguous beliefs represented by a set of priors (C). This rule takes the form of app…