activity
20202026
most citedThe Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations

6 citations · 34 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

26 papers

cs.GT2026

Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversary

Simone Di Gregorio, Paul Dütting, Federico Fusco +1

Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, who wish to trade a good. We study this problem from the perspective of a prof…

cs.GT2025★ 1 cited

Nearly Tight Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade

Simone Di Gregorio, Paul Dütting, Federico Fusco +1

Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this…

cs.DS2024

The Cost of Consistency: Submodular Maximization with Constant Recourse

Paul Dütting, Federico Fusco, Silvio Lattanzi +3

In this work, we study online submodular maximization, and how the requirement of maintaining a stable solution impacts the approximation. In particular, we seek bounds on the best…

cs.GT2024★ 2 cited

Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective

Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Paul Dütting +1

Motivated by online retail, we consider the problem of selling one item (e.g., an ad slot) to two non-excludable buyers (say, a merchant and a brand). This problem captures, for ex…

cs.DS2024

Consistent Submodular Maximization

Paul Dütting, Federico Fusco, Silvio Lattanzi +2

Maximizing monotone submodular functions under cardinality constraints is a classic optimization task with several applications in data mining and machine learning. In this paper w…

cs.GT2023★ 6 cited

The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations

Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni +2

We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our ma…