4 papers
Two Heads are Better Than One: Test-time Scaling of Multi-agent Collaborative Reasoning
Can Jin, Hongwu Peng, Qixin Zhang +4
Test-Time Scaling has emerged as a powerful method to extend the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models. However, single-agent TTS faces significant scalability bottleneck…
O'Neill's Theorem for Games
Srihari Govindan, Rida Laraki, Lucas Pahl
We present an analog of O'Neill's Theorem (Theorem 5.2 in [17]) for finite games, which reveals some of the structure of equilibria under payoff perturbations in finite games.
A Finite Characterization of Perfect Equilibria
Ivonne Callejas, Srihari Govindan, Lucas Pahl
Govindan and Klumpp [7] provided a characterization of perfect equilibria using Lexicographic Probability Systems (LPSs). Their characterization was essentially finite in that they…
On Sustainable Equilibria
Srihari Govindan, Rida Laraki, Lucas Pahl
Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game o…