13 citations · 17 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Robust Analysis of Auction Equilibria
Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy, Samuel Taggart
Equilibria in auctions can be very difficult to analyze, beyond the symmetric environments where revenue equivalence renders the analysis straightforward. This paper takes a robust…
An Algorithmic Introduction to Savings Circles
Rediet Abebe, Adam Eck, Christian Ikeokwu +1
Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) are informal financial organizations common in settings where communities have reduced access to formal financial institutions. In…
An Improved Welfare Guarantee for First Price Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart, Zihe Wang
This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is at least a -fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents' value…
Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms
Jason Hartline, Samuel Taggart
This paper considers the design of non-truthful mechanisms from samples. We identify a parameterized family of mechanisms with strategically simple winner-pays-bid, all-pay, and tr…
Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue
Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart
This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of…