2 citations · 4 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Multi-Principal Competition for an Exclusive Agent: characterization and approximation of Nash Equilibria
Luis Briceño-Arias, Nicolás Hernández-Santibáñez, Vicente Moreno-Garrido
This paper introduces and studies a Principal-Agent competition model in which two risk-neutral Principals compete to hire a single Agent. The Agent chooses to work exclusively for…
Investment and Operational Planning for electricity markets with massive entry of renewable energy
Nicolás Hernández-Santibáñez, Alejandro Jofré, Matías Vera
In wholesale electricity markets, electricity producers and the independent system operator (ISO) play a central role. The ISO is responsible for minimizing production costs while…
Closed-loop equilibria for Stackelberg games: a story about stochastic targets
Camilo Hernández, Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez, Emma Hubert +1
We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with…
Principal-Multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez
We study a general contracting problem between the principal and a finite set of competitive agents, who perform equivalent changes of measure by controlling the drift of the outpu…
Pollution regulation for electricity generators in a transmission network
Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez, Alejandro Jofré, Dylan Possamaï
In this paper we study a pollution regulation problem in an electricity market with a network structure. The market is ruled by an independent system operator (ISO for short) who h…
Contract theory in a VUCA world
Nicolás Hernández Santibánez, Thibaut Mastrolia
In this paper we investigate a Principal-Agent problem with moral hazard under Knightian uncertainty. We extend the seminal framework of Holmström and Milgrom by combining a Stacke…
An adverse selection approach to power pricing
Clémence Alasseur, Ivar Ekeland, Romuald Elie +2
We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs. This question is tackled within the framework of Principal-Agent problems…