10 citations · 14 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Misperception and informativeness in statistical discrimination
Matteo Escudé, Paula Onuchic, Ludvig Sinander +1
We study the interplay of information and prior (mis)perceptions in a Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type model of statistical discrimination in the labor market. We decompose the effect on av…
Covert learning and disclosure
Matteo Escudé
I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is…
Statistical discrimination and statistical informativeness
Matteo Escudé, Paula Onuchic, Ludvig Sinander +1
We study the link between Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type statistical discrimination and familiar notions of statistical informativeness. Our central insight is that Blackwell's Theorem, s…
Slow persuasion
Matteo Escudé, Ludvig Sinander
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public infor…
Strictly strategy-proof auctions
Matteo Escudé, Ludvig Sinander
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we s…