2 citations · 2 across the 1 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2025
Misperception and informativeness in statistical discrimination
Matteo Escudé, Paula Onuchic, Ludvig Sinander +1
We study the interplay of information and prior (mis)perceptions in a Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type model of statistical discrimination in the labor market. We decompose the effect on av…
econ.TH2022★ 2 cited
Statistical discrimination and statistical informativeness
Matteo Escudé, Paula Onuchic, Ludvig Sinander +1
We study the link between Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type statistical discrimination and familiar notions of statistical informativeness. Our central insight is that Blackwell's Theorem, s…
econ.TH2018
Strictly strategy-proof auctions
Matteo Escudé, Ludvig Sinander
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we s…