activity
20182025
most citedNo-harm principle, rationality, and Pareto optimality in games

1 citations · 1 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

14 papers

econ.TH2025

Making Tennis Fairer: The Grand Tiebreaker

Steven J. Brams, Mehmet S. Ismail, D. Marc Kilgour

Tennis, like other games and sports, is governed by rules, including the rules that determine the winner of points, games, sets, and matches. If the two players are equally skilled…

econ.TH2023

Performance rating in chess, tennis, and other contexts

Mehmet S. Ismail

In this note, I introduce Estimated Performance Rating (PR), a novel system for evaluating player performance in sports and games. PR addresses a key limitation of the Tour…

econ.TH2023

Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The Rule

Steven J. Brams, Mehmet S. Ismail, D. Marc Kilgour

Winning the coin toss at the end of a tied soccer game gives a team the right to choose whether to kick either first or second on all five rounds of penalty kicks, when each team i…

cs.GT2022

Optimin achieves super-Nash performance

Mehmet S. Ismail

Since the 1990s, AI systems have achieved superhuman performance in major zero-sum games where "winning" has an unambiguous definition. However, most social interactions are mixed-…

econ.TH2022

AI-powered mechanisms as judges: Breaking ties in chess

Nejat Anbarci, Mehmet S. Ismail

Recently, Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology use has been rising in sports to reach decisions of various complexity. At a relatively low complexity level, for example, major t…

econ.TH2022

Exploring the Constraints on Artificial General Intelligence: A Game-Theoretic No-Go Theorem

Mehmet S. Ismail

The emergence of increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) systems have sparked intense debate among researchers, policymakers, and the public due to their potential…

econ.TH2022

Rationality and correctness in n-player games

Lorenzo Bastianello, Mehmet S. Ismail

There are two well-known sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in two-player games: mutual knowledge of rationality (MKR) and mutual knowledge of conjectures. MKR assumes that…

econ.TH2021

Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black

Steven J. Brams, Mehmet S. Ismail

Unlike tic-tac-toe or checkers, in which optimal play leads to a draw, it is not known whether optimal play in chess ends in a win for White, a win for Black, or a draw. But after…

econ.TH2021

Conditional strategy equilibrium

Lorenzo Bastianello, Mehmet S. Ismail

In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function fro…

econ.TH2021★ 1 cited

No-harm principle, rationality, and Pareto optimality in games

Shaun Hargreaves Heap, Mehmet S. Ismail

Mill's classic argument for liberty requires that people's exercise of freedom should be governed by a no-harm principle (NHP). In this paper, we develop the concept of a no-harm e…

econ.TH2020

Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games

Nejat Anbarcı, Kutay Cingiz, Mehmet S. Ismail

A variety of social, economic, and political interactions have long been modelled after Blotto games. In this paper, we introduce a general model of dynamic -player Blotto conte…

econ.TH2019

Super-Nash Performance

Mehmet S. Ismail

In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profi…

math.HO2018

Catch-Up: A Rule that Makes Service Sports More Competitive

Steven J. Brams, Mehmet S. Ismail, D. Marc Kilgour +1

Service sports include two-player contests such as volleyball, badminton, and squash. We analyze four rules, including the Standard Rule (SR), in which a player continues to serve…

econ.TH2018

The strategy of conflict and cooperation

Mehmet S. Ismail

This paper introduces a unified framework called cooperative extensive form games, which (i) generalizes standard non-cooperative games, and (ii) allows for more complex coalition…