62 citations · 72 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Fair Decisions through Plurality: Results from a Crowdfunding Platform
Joel Miller, E. Glen Weyl, Chris Kanich
We discuss an algorithmic intervention aimed at increasing equity and economic efficiency at a crowdfunding platform that gives cash subsidies to grantees. Through a blend of techn…
Community by Design
E. Glen Weyl, Luke Thorburn, Emillie de Keulenaar +3
Social media empower distributed content creation by algorithmically harnessing "the social fabric" (explicit and implicit signals of association) to serve this content. While this…
Prospecting a Possible Quadratic Wormhole Between Quantum Mechanics and Plurality
Michal Fabinger, Michael H. Freedman, E. Glen Weyl
We illustrate some formal symmetries between Quadratic Funding (Buterin et al., 2019), a mechanism for the (approximately optimal) determination of public good funding levels, and…
A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods
Vitalik Buterin, Zoe Hitzig, E. Glen Weyl
We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly-funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extend…
Functional Forms for Tractable Economic Models and the Cost Structure of International Trade
Michal Fabinger, E. Glen Weyl
We present functional forms allowing a broader range of analytic solutions to common economic equilibrium problems. These can increase the realism of pen-and-paper solutions or spe…
Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search
Robert Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner, E. Glen Weyl
Investigating potential purchases is often a substantial investment under uncertainty. Standard market designs, such as simultaneous or English auctions, compound this with uncerta…
Nash Equilbria for Quadratic Voting
Steven P. Lalley, E. Glen Weyl
Voters making a binary decision purchase votes from a centralized clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased. The net payoff to an agent with utility wh…