collaborators

6 papers

econ.GN2018

Sion's mini-max theorem and Nash equilibrium in a five-players game with two groups which is zero-sum and symmetric in each group

Atsuhiro Satoh, Yasuhito Tanaka

We consider the relation between Sion's minimax theorem for a continuous function and a Nash equilibrium in a five-players game with two groups which is zero-sum and symmetric in e…

econ.GN2018

Nash equilibrium of partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables

Atsuhiro Satoh, Yasuhito Tanaka

We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, and Player C does not. Two strate…

math.OC2018

Sion's mini-max theorem and Nash equilibrium in a multi-players game with two groups which is zero-sum and symmetric in each group

Atsuhiro Satoh, Yasuhito Tanaka

We consider the relation between Sion's minimax theorem for a continuous function and a Nash equilibrium in a multi-players game with two groups which is zero-sum and symmetric in…

math.OC2018

Nash equilibrium in asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables and only one alien

Atsuhiro Satoh, Yasuhito Tanaka

We consider a partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. All but one players have the same payoff functions, and one player (Player ) does no…

econ.EM2018

On the relation between Sion's minimax theorem and existence of Nash equilibrium in asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game with only one alien

Atsuhiro Satoh, Yasuhito Tanaka

We consider the relation between Sion's minimax theorem for a continuous function and a Nash equilibrium in an asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game in which only one player is di…

q-fin.MF2018

Minimax theorem and Nash equilibrium of symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables

Masahiko Hattori, Atsuhiro Satoh, Yasuhito Tanaka

We consider a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There are players, . Each player is denoted by . Two strategic variables are