activity
20182025
most citedOptimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous Monitoring Technology

4 citations · 11 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

10 papers

econ.TH2025

Implicit Incentive Provision with Misspecified Learning

Federico Echenique, Anqi Li

We study misspecified Bayesian learning in principal-agent relationships, where an agent is assessed by an evaluator and rewarded by the market. The agent's outcome depends on thei…

econ.TH2023

Misspecified Model Estimation and Its Impact on Predictions

Junnan He, Lin Hu, Matthew Kovach +1

We study a linear statistical model where outcomes depend on regressors with fixed population coefficients and observation-specific latent coefficients, along with measurement erro…

econ.TH2022★ 3 cited

Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps

Federico Echenique, Anqi Li

When information acquisition is costly but flexible, a principal may rationally acquire information that favors one group over another. The former group faces incentives to invest…

econ.TH2021★ 3 cited

Rationally Inattentive Echo Chambers

Lin Hu, Anqi Li, Xu Tan

Rationally inattentive players allocate limited attention capacities to biased primary sources and to other players as secondary sources to acquire information about an uncertain s…

econ.TH2020

Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information Aggregation

Anqi Li, Lin Hu

We study a model of electoral accountability and selection whereby heterogeneous voters aggregate incumbent politician's performance data into personalized signals through paying l…

econ.GN2019

The Politics of Personalized News Aggregation

Lin Hu, Anqi Li, Ilya Segal

We study how personalized news aggregation for rationally inattentive voters (NARI) affects policy polarization and public opinion. In a two-candidate electoral competition model,…

econ.GN2019★ 1 cited

Propaganda, Alternative Media, and Accountability in Fragile Democracies

Anqi Li, Davin Raiha, Kenneth W. Shotts

We develop a model of electoral accountability with mainstream and alternative media. In addition to regular high- and low-competence types, the incumbent may be an aspiring autocr…

econ.TH2018

Intermediated Implementation

Anqi Li, Yiqing Xing

We examine problems of ``intermediated implementation,'' in which a single principal can only regulate limited aspects of the consumption bundles traded between intermediaries and…

econ.TH2018★ 4 cited

Optimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous Monitoring Technology

Anqi Li, Ming Yang

Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of…

econ.GN2018

The Politics of Attention

Li Hu, Anqi Li

We develop an equilibrium theory of attention and politics. In a spatial model of electoral competition where candidates have varying policy preferences, we examine what kinds of p…