17 citations · 22 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Bundling Complements
Weijie Zhong
I study a monopolist selling goods to a buyer with combinatorial preferences. The seller's dual is a minimum-cost flow of the differential virtual value. I characterize two reducti…
Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection
Navin Kartik, Weijie Zhong
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simp…
Engagement Maximization
Benjamin Hébert, Weijie Zhong
We investigate the management of information provision to maximize user engagement. A principal sequentially reveals signals to an agent who has a limited amount of information pro…
Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
Yeon-Koo Che, Weijie Zhong
We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distribution…
Statistical Discrimination in Ratings-Guided Markets
Yeon-Koo Che, Kyungmin Kim, Weijie Zhong
We study statistical discrimination of individuals based on payoff-irrelevant social identities in markets that utilize ratings and recommendations for social learning. Even though…
Selling Information
Weijie Zhong
I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monop…
Information Acquisition and Time-Risk Preference
Daniel Chen, Weijie Zhong
An agent acquires information dynamically until her belief about a binary state reaches an upper or lower threshold. She can choose any signal process subject to a constraint on th…
The Indirect Cost of Information
Weijie Zhong
We study the indirect cost of information from sequential information cost minimization. A key sub-additivity condition, together with monotonicity equivalently characterizes the c…
Information Design Possibility Set
Weijie Zhong
Let be the set of all combinations of expected value of finite objective functions from designing information. I showed that is a compact and convex set…