54 citations · 181 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers · 1 filter
Alignment faking in large language models
Ryan Greenblatt, Carson Denison, Benjamin Wright +17
We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its beha…
Subversion Strategy Eval: Can language models statelessly strategize to subvert control protocols?
Alex Mallen, Charlie Griffin, Misha Wagner +2
An AI control protocol is a plan for usefully deploying AI systems that aims to prevent an AI from intentionally causing some unacceptable outcome. This paper investigates how well…
Adaptive Deployment of Untrusted LLMs Reduces Distributed Threats
Jiaxin Wen, Vivek Hebbar, Caleb Larson +9
As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previou…
Towards evaluations-based safety cases for AI scheming
Mikita Balesni, Marius Hobbhahn, David Lindner +13
We sketch how developers of frontier AI systems could construct a structured rationale -- a 'safety case' -- that an AI system is unlikely to cause catastrophic outcomes through sc…
Sabotage Evaluations for Frontier Models
Joe Benton, Misha Wagner, Eric Christiansen +13
Sufficiently capable models could subvert human oversight and decision-making in important contexts. For example, in the context of AI development, models could covertly sabotage e…
Games for AI Control: Models of Safety Evaluations of AI Deployment Protocols
Charlie Griffin, Louis Thomson, Buck Shlegeris +1
To evaluate the safety and usefulness of deployment protocols for untrusted AIs, AI Control uses a red-teaming exercise played between a protocol designer and an adversary. This pa…
Sycophancy to Subterfuge: Investigating Reward-Tampering in Large Language Models
Carson Denison, Monte MacDiarmid, Fazl Barez +11
In reinforcement learning, specification gaming occurs when AI systems learn undesired behaviors that are highly rewarded due to misspecified training goals. Specification gaming c…
Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training
Evan Hubinger, Carson Denison, Jesse Mu +36
Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when giv…