54 citations · 181 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers · 1 filter
Auditing Sabotage Bench: A Benchmark for Detecting and Fixing Research Sabotage in ML Codebases
Eric Gan, Aryan Bhatt, Buck Shlegeris +2
As AI systems are increasingly used to conduct research autonomously, misaligned systems could introduce subtle flaws that produce misleading results while evading detection. We in…
Evaluating Control Protocols for Untrusted AI Agents
Jon Kutasov, Chloe Loughridge, Yuqi Sun +4
As AI systems become more capable and widely deployed as agents, ensuring their safe operation becomes critical. AI control offers one approach to mitigating the risk from untruste…
SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agents
Jonathan Kutasov, Yuqi Sun, Paul Colognese +9
As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in complex and long horizon settings, it is critical to evaluate their ability to sabotage users by p…
Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety
Tomek Korbak, Mikita Balesni, Elizabeth Barnes +38
AI systems that "think" in human language offer a unique opportunity for AI safety: we can monitor their chains of thought (CoT) for the intent to misbehave. Like all other known A…
The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities
Yoshua Bengio, Tegan Maharaj, Luke Ong +84
Rapidly improving AI capabilities and autonomy hold significant promise of transformation, but are also driving vigorous debate on how to ensure that AI is safe, i.e., trustworthy,…
How to evaluate control measures for LLM agents? A trajectory from today to superintelligence
Tomek Korbak, Mikita Balesni, Buck Shlegeris +1
As LLM agents grow more capable of causing harm autonomously, AI developers will rely on increasingly sophisticated control measures to prevent possibly misaligned agents from caus…
A sketch of an AI control safety case
Tomek Korbak, Joshua Clymer, Benjamin Hilton +2
As LLM agents gain a greater capacity to cause harm, AI developers might increasingly rely on control measures such as monitoring to justify that they are safe. We sketch how devel…
Alignment faking in large language models
Ryan Greenblatt, Carson Denison, Benjamin Wright +17
We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its beha…
Games for AI Control: Models of Safety Evaluations of AI Deployment Protocols
Charlie Griffin, Louis Thomson, Buck Shlegeris +1
To evaluate the safety and usefulness of deployment protocols for untrusted AIs, AI Control uses a red-teaming exercise played between a protocol designer and an adversary. This pa…
Sycophancy to Subterfuge: Investigating Reward-Tampering in Large Language Models
Carson Denison, Monte MacDiarmid, Fazl Barez +11
In reinforcement learning, specification gaming occurs when AI systems learn undesired behaviors that are highly rewarded due to misspecified training goals. Specification gaming c…