1 citations · 2 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers
Calibrated Mechanism Design
Laura Doval, Alex Smolin
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static fram…
Social Learning in Lung Transplant Decision
Laura Doval, Federico Echenique Wanying Huang, Yi Xin
We study the allocation of deceased-donor lungs to patients in need of a transplant. Patients make sequential decisions in an order dictated by a priority policy. Using data from a…
Revealed Information
Laura Doval, Ran Eilat, Tianhao Liu +1
An analyst observes the frequency with which a decision maker (DM) takes actions, but not the frequency conditional on payoff-relevant states. We ask when the analyst can rationali…
Local hedging approximately solves Pandora's box problems with nonobligatory inspection
Ziv Scully, Laura Doval
We consider search problems with nonobligatory inspection and single-item or combinatorial selection. A decision maker is presented with a number of items, each of which contains a…
Consistent Conjectures in Dynamic Matching Markets
Laura Doval, Pablo Schenone
We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the s…
Managing Congestion in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Online Rentals
Caterina Calsamiglia, Laura Doval, Alejandro Robinson-Cortés +1
Thick two-sided matching platforms, such as the room-rental market, face the challenge of showing relevant objects to users to reduce search costs. Many platforms use ranking algor…
The Core of Bayesian Persuasion
Laura Doval, Ran Eilat
An analyst observes the frequency with which an agent takes actions, but not the frequency with which she takes actions conditional on a payoff relevant state. In this setting, we…
Persuasion and Welfare
Laura Doval, Alex Smolin
Information policies such as scores, ratings, and recommendations are increasingly shaping society's choices in high-stakes domains. We provide a framework to study the welfare imp…
Purchase history and product personalization
Laura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta
Product personalization opens the door to price discrimination. A rich product line allows firms to better tailor products to consumers' tastes, but the mere choice of a product ca…
Dynamically Stable Matching
Laura Doval
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii)…
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
Laura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's valuation is binary and fully persistent. We sh…
Constrained Information Design
Laura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta
We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by extending the insight in Le Treust and Tomala (2019) to the case of multiple inequality…
Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
Laura Doval, Vasiliki Skreta
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical cla…