2 citations · 3 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Dynamics and Contracts for an Agent with Misspecified Beliefs
Yingkai Li, Argyris Oikonomou
We study a single-agent contracting environment where the agent has misspecified beliefs about the outcome distributions for each chosen action. First, we show that for a myopic Ba…
Computing Simple Mechanisms: Lift-and-Round over Marginal Reduced Forms
Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Mingfei Zhao
We study revenue maximization in multi-item multi-bidder auctions under the natural item-independence assumption - a classical problem in Multi-Dimensional Bayesian Mechanism Desig…
On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items
Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou
We study the problem of selling heterogeneous items to a single buyer, whose values for different items are dependent. Under arbitrary dependence, Hart and Nisan show that no s…
An Efficient -BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization
Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Grigoris Velegkas +1
We consider the black-box reduction from multi-dimensional revenue maximization to virtual welfare maximization. Cai et al. show a polynomial-time approximation-preserving reductio…