activity
20172022
most citedWeighted Committee Games

14 citations · 31 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

7 papers

econ.EM2022★ 2 cited

Asymptotic Properties of Endogeneity Corrections Using Nonlinear Transformations

Jörg Breitung, Alexander Mayer, Dominik Wied

This paper considers a linear regression model with an endogenous regressor which arises from a nonlinear transformation of a latent variable. It is shown that the corresponding co…

stat.ME2022

Consistent Estimation of Multiple Breakpoints in Dependence Measures

Marvin Borsch, Alexander Mayer, Dominik Wied

This paper proposes different methods to consistently detect multiple breaks in copula-based dependence measures, mainly focusing on Spearman's . The leading model is a factor c…

econ.EM2022★ 1 cited

Two-step estimation in linear regressions with adaptive learning

Alexander Mayer

Weak consistency and asymptotic normality of the ordinary least-squares estimator in a linear regression with adaptive learning is derived when the crucial, so-called, `gain' param…

cs.GT2021

The Art and Beauty of Voting Power

Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer, Stefan Napel

We exhibit the hidden beauty of weighted voting and voting power by applying a generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf index to social choice rules. Three players who have multiple v…

econ.EM2021

Estimation and Inference in Factor Copula Models with Exogenous Covariates

Alexander Mayer, Dominik Wied

A factor copula model is proposed in which factors are either simulable or estimable from exogenous information. Point estimation and inference are based on a simulated methods of…

cs.GT2019★ 14 cited

Influence in Weighted Committees

Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer, Stefan Napel

A committee's decisions on more than two alternatives much depend on the adopted voting method, and so does the distribution of power among the committee members. We investigate ho…

math.CO2017★ 14 cited

Weighted Committee Games

Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer, Stefan Napel

Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games. We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of altern…