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20192023
most citedGotta Catch 'Em All: Using Honeypots to Catch Adversarial Attacks on Neural Networks

75 citations · 242 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing cs.CRShow all

11 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2023★ 3 cited

SALSA VERDE: a machine learning attack on Learning With Errors with sparse small secrets

Cathy Yuanchen Li, Emily Wenger, Zeyuan Allen-Zhu +2

Learning with Errors (LWE) is a hard math problem used in post-quantum cryptography. Homomorphic Encryption (HE) schemes rely on the hardness of the LWE problem for their security,…

cs.CR2023

SALSA PICANTE: a machine learning attack on LWE with binary secrets

Cathy Li, Jana Sotáková, Emily Wenger +4

Learning with Errors (LWE) is a hard math problem underpinning many proposed post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) systems. The only PQC Key Exchange Mechanism (KEM) standardized by NIS…

cs.CR2023★ 43 cited

Glaze: Protecting Artists from Style Mimicry by Text-to-Image Models

Shawn Shan, Jenna Cryan, Emily Wenger +3

Recent text-to-image diffusion models such as MidJourney and Stable Diffusion threaten to displace many in the professional artist community. In particular, models can learn to mim…

cs.CR2022

Data Isotopes for Data Provenance in DNNs

Emily Wenger, Xiuyu Li, Ben Y. Zhao +1

Today, creators of data-hungry deep neural networks (DNNs) scour the Internet for training fodder, leaving users with little control over or knowledge of when their data is appropr…

cs.CR2022★ 10 cited

SALSA: Attacking Lattice Cryptography with Transformers

Emily Wenger, Mingjie Chen, François Charton +1

Currently deployed public-key cryptosystems will be vulnerable to attacks by full-scale quantum computers. Consequently, "quantum resistant" cryptosystems are in high demand, and l…

cs.CR2022★ 11 cited

Post-breach Recovery: Protection against White-box Adversarial Examples for Leaked DNN Models

Shawn Shan, Wenxin Ding, Emily Wenger +2

Server breaches are an unfortunate reality on today's Internet. In the context of deep neural network (DNN) models, they are particularly harmful, because a leaked model gives an a…

cs.CR2022★ 2 cited

Assessing Privacy Risks from Feature Vector Reconstruction Attacks

Emily Wenger, Francesca Falzon, Josephine Passananti +2

In deep neural networks for facial recognition, feature vectors are numerical representations that capture the unique features of a given face. While it is known that a version of…

cs.CR2021

SoK: Anti-Facial Recognition Technology

Emily Wenger, Shawn Shan, Haitao Zheng +1

The rapid adoption of facial recognition (FR) technology by both government and commercial entities in recent years has raised concerns about civil liberties and privacy. In respon…

cs.CR2021★ 38 cited

"Hello, It's Me": Deep Learning-based Speech Synthesis Attacks in the Real World

Emily Wenger, Max Bronckers, Christian Cianfarani +4

Advances in deep learning have introduced a new wave of voice synthesis tools, capable of producing audio that sounds as if spoken by a target speaker. If successful, such tools in…

cs.CR2020★ 12 cited

Blacklight: Scalable Defense for Neural Networks against Query-Based Black-Box Attacks

Huiying Li, Shawn Shan, Emily Wenger +3

Deep learning systems are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. In particular, query-based black-box attacks do not require knowledge of the deep learning model, but can…

cs.CR2020★ 48 cited

Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models

Shawn Shan, Emily Wenger, Jiayun Zhang +3

Today's proliferation of powerful facial recognition systems poses a real threat to personal privacy. As Clearview.ai demonstrated, anyone can canvas the Internet for data and trai…