3 papers
econ.TH2025
Replacement and Reputation
Navin Kartik, Elliot Lipnowski, Harry Pei
Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters' interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents' performance an…
econ.TH2025
Commitment, Conflict, and Status Quo in Bargaining
Harry Pei
Each period, two players bargain over a unit of surplus. Each player chooses between remaining flexible and committing to a take-it-or-leave-it offer at a cost. If players' committ…
econ.TH2020
Reputation Building under Observational Learning
Harry Pei
I study a social learning model in which the object to learn is a strategic player's endogenous actions rather than an exogenous state. A patient seller faces a sequence of buyers…