6 papers
Informative Imitation
Nemanja Antic, Harry Pei
We study steady-state equilibria of a sequential learning game in which each agent chooses between a safe action and a risky action of unknown profitability. Before choosing, each…
Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations
Nemanja Antic, Harry Pei
We develop an overlapping generations model where each agent observes a verifiable private signal about the state and, with positive probability, also receives signals disclosed by…
Replacement and Reputation
Navin Kartik, Elliot Lipnowski, Harry Pei
Does electoral replacement ensure that officeholders eventually act in voters' interests? We study a reputational model of accountability. Voters observe incumbents' performance an…
Commitment, Conflict, and Status Quo in Bargaining
Harry Pei
Each period, two players bargain over a unit of surplus. Each player chooses between remaining flexible and committing to a take-it-or-leave-it offer at a cost. If players' committ…
Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records
Harry Pei
I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players endogenously decide whether to disclose signals about their past actions. I establish an-anti folk theorem, that…
Reputation Building under Observational Learning
Harry Pei
I study a social learning model in which the object to learn is a strategic player's endogenous actions rather than an exogenous state. A patient seller faces a sequence of buyers…