8 citations · 20 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for
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No Extra Signals Needed: The Uniform Price of Explainable Information Design
Francesco Bacchiocchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni
In information design, an informed sender aims to influence a receiver's decision by committing to a signaling scheme. However, optimal signaling schemes often rely on randomizatio…
Online Budget Allocation with Censored Semi-Bandit Feedback
François Bachoc, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari +1
We study a stochastic budget-allocation problem over tasks. At each round , the learner chooses an allocation . Task succeeds with probability $F_k(X_{t,k})…
Market Making without Regret
Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni +2
We consider a sequential decision-making setting where, at every round , a market maker posts a bid price and an ask price to an incoming trader (the taker) with a p…
Fair Online Bilateral Trade
François Bachoc, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari +1
In online bilateral trade, a platform posts prices to incoming pairs of buyers and sellers that have private valuations for a certain good. If the price is lower than the buyers' v…
Trading Volume Maximization with Online Learning
Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni
We explore brokerage between traders in an online learning framework. At any round , two traders meet to exchange an asset, provided the exchange is mutually beneficial. The bro…
The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations
Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni +2
We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our ma…
Bilateral Trade: A Regret Minimization Perspective
Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni +2
Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they h…