28 citations · 34 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2025
Persuasion with Verifiable Information
Maria Titova, Kun Zhang
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We c…
econ.TH2020★ 6 cited
Contracting over persistent information
Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou +1
We consider a dynamic moral hazard problem between a principal and an agent, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information.…
cs.GT2014★ 28 cited
Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Task Allocation in the Presence of Execution Uncertainty
Sarvapali Dyanand Ramchurn, Claudio Mezzetti, Andrea Giovannucci +3
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficien…