12 citations · 14 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design
Jason Milionis, Dean Hirsch, Andy Arditi +1
Lately, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), i.e., uniquely discernible assets on a blockchain, have skyrocketed in popularity by addressing a broad audience. However, the typical NFT aucti…
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions
Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis +2
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the…
PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis +1
We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior w…
Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis +1
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality. The indivisibility of the goods is long known to pose highl…