12 citations · 18 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers
Beyond Winner-Take-All Procurement Auctions
Pranav Garimidi, Michael Neuder, Tim Roughgarden
Blockchain protocols often seek to procure computationally challenging work from a decentralized set of participants. While there are simple procurement auctions that result in the…
Multiple Concurrent Proposers: Why and How
Pranav Garimidi, Joachim Neu, Max Resnick
Traditional single-proposer blockchains suffer from miner extractable value (MEV), where validators exploit their serial monopoly on transaction inclusion and ordering to extract r…
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols
Pranav Garimidi, Lioba Heimbach, Tim Roughgarden
We initiate the study of transaction fee mechanism design for blockchain protocols in which multiple block producers contribute to the production of each block. Our contributions i…
Centralization in Block Building and Proposer-Builder Separation
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
The goal of this paper is to rigorously interrogate conventional wisdom about centralization in block-building (due to, e.g., MEV and private order flow) and the outsourcing of blo…
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards e…
When Bidders Are DAOs
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
In a typical decentralized autonomous organization (DAO), people organize themselves into a group that is programmatically managed. DAOs can act as bidders in auctions, with a DAO'…
A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design
Jason Milionis, Dean Hirsch, Andy Arditi +1
Lately, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), i.e., uniquely discernible assets on a blockchain, have skyrocketed in popularity by addressing a broad audience. However, the typical NFT aucti…
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions
Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis +2
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the…
PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis +1
We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior w…
Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods
Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis +1
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality. The indivisibility of the goods is long known to pose highl…