activity
20172026
most citedCompositional Security for Reentrant Applications

39 citations · 86 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

11 papers

cs.PL2026

Step in Tine: Forking Processes in Functional Choreographies

Ashley Samuelson, Andrew K. Hirsch, Ethan Cecchetti

Traditional concurrent-programming techniques require programmers to painstakingly write programs for each participant in a concurrent system. Choreographic programming, in contras…

cs.PL2025

zkStruDul: Programming zkSNARKs with Structural Duality

Rahul Krishnan, Ashley Samuelson, Emily Yao +1

Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) proofs, such as zkSNARKS, let one prove knowledge of private data without revealing it or interacting with a verifier. While existing tooling…

cs.PL2025

Choreographic Quick Changes: First-Class Location (Set) Polymorphism

Ashley Samuelson, Andrew K. Hirsch, Ethan Cecchetti

Choreographic programming is a promising new paradigm for programming concurrent systems where a developer writes a single centralized program that compiles to individual programs…

cs.CR2025

Nonmalleable Progress Leakage

Ethan Cecchetti

Information-flow control systems often enforce progress-insensitive noninterference, as it is simple to understand and enforce. Unfortunately, real programs need to declassify resu…

cs.CR2024★ 1 cited

A Language for Smart Contracts with Secure Control Flow (Technical Report)

Siqiu Yao, Haobin Ni, Stephanie Ma +3

Smart contracts are frequently vulnerable to control-flow attacks based on confused deputies, reentrancy, and incorrect error handling. These attacks exploit the complexity of inte…

cs.CR2024★ 1 cited

Computationally Bounded Robust Compilation and Universally Composable Security

Robert Künnemann, Marco Patrignani, Ethan Cecchetti

Universal Composability (UC) is the gold standard for cryptographic security, but mechanizing proofs of UC is notoriously difficult. A recently-discovered connection between UC and…

cs.CR2021★ 39 cited

Compositional Security for Reentrant Applications

Ethan Cecchetti, Siqiu Yao, Haobin Ni +1

The disastrous vulnerabilities in smart contracts sharply remind us of our ignorance: we do not know how to write code that is secure in composition with malicious code. Informatio…

cs.PL2020★ 2 cited

Giving Semantics to Program-Counter Labels via Secure Effects

Andrew K. Hirsch, Ethan Cecchetti

Type systems designed for information-flow control commonly use a program-counter label to track the sensitivity of the context and rule out data leakage arising from effectful com…

cs.CR2020★ 2 cited

First-Order Logic for Flow-Limited Authorization

Andrew K. Hirsch, Pedro H. Azevedo de Amorim, Ethan Cecchetti +2

We present the Flow-Limited Authorization First-Order Logic (FLAFOL), a logic for reasoning about authorization decisions in the presence of information-flow policies. We formalize…

cs.DC2018★ 9 cited

Obladi: Oblivious Serializable Transactions in the Cloud

Natacha Crooks, Matthew Burke, Ethan Cecchetti +3

This paper presents the design and implementation of Obladi, the first system to provide ACID transactions while also hiding access patterns. Obladi uses as its building block obli…

cs.CR2017★ 32 cited

Nonmalleable Information Flow: Technical Report

Ethan Cecchetti, Andrew C. Myers, Owen Arden

Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guarantees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple secur…