activity
20202024
most citedCommitment Against Front Running Attacks

10 citations · 10 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

econ.TH2024

Fair Combinatorial Auctions: Endogenous Best Execution in Blockchain Trade-Intent Markets

Andrea Canidio, Felix Henneke

Trade-intent auctions intermediate around USD~9~billion in monthly trading volume. In these auctions, specialized intermediaries called solvers compete for the right to execute ord…

cs.DC2024

Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity

Robin Fritsch, Andrea Canidio

This paper presents the results of a comprehensive empirical study of losses to arbitrageurs (following the formalization of loss-versus-rebalancing by [Milionis et al., 2022]) inc…

cs.DC2023

Arbitrageurs' profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response

Andrea Canidio, Robin Fritsch

We study a novel automated market maker design: the function maximizing AMM (FM-AMM). Our central assumption is that trades are batched before execution. Because of competition bet…

econ.TH2023

Auctions with Tokens: Monetary Policy as a Mechanism Design Choice

Andrea Canidio

I study a repeated auction in which payments are made with a blockchain token created and initially owned by the auction designer. Unlike the ``virtual money'' previously examined…

econ.TH2023★ 10 cited

Commitment Against Front Running Attacks

Andrea Canidio, Vincent Danos

We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the problem of front-running attacks. We use it to distinguish attacks from legitimate competition among honest users for having their trans…

cs.CR2020

Private-Yet-Verifiable Contact Tracing

Andrea Canidio, Gabriele Costa, Letterio Galletta

We propose PrYVeCT, a private-yet-verifiable contact tracing system. PrYVeCT works also as an authorization framework allowing for the definition of fine-grained policies, which a…