3 citations · 7 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Enforcing Priority in Schedule-based User Equilibrium Transit Assignment
Liyang Feng, Hanlin Sun, Yu Marco Nie +2
Denied boarding in congested transit systems induces queuing delays and departure-time shifts that can reshape passenger flows. Correctly modeling these responses in transit assign…
Addressing the alignment problem in transportation policy making: an LLM approach
Xiaoyu Yan, Tianxing Dai, Yu Marco Nie
A key challenge in transportation planning is that the collective preferences of heterogeneous travelers often diverge from the policies produced by model-driven decision tools. Th…
A Cardinality-Constrained Approach to Combinatorial Bilevel Congestion Pricing
Lei Guo, Jiayang Li, Yu Marco Nie +1
Combinatorial bilevel congestion pricing (CBCP), a variant of the mixed (continuous/discrete) network design problems, seeks to minimize the total travel time experienced by all tr…
A Day-to-Day Dynamical Approach to the Most Likely User Equilibrium Problem
Jiayang Li, Qianni Wang, Liyang Feng +2
The lack of a unique user equilibrium (UE) route flow in traffic assignment has posed a significant challenge to many transportation applications. The maximum-entropy principle, wh…
Wardrop Equilibrium Can Be Boundedly Rational: A New Behavioral Theory of Route Choice
Jiayang Li, Zhaoran Wang, Yu Marco Nie
As one of the most fundamental concepts in transportation science, Wardrop equilibrium (WE) has always had a relatively weak behavioral underpinning. To strengthen this foundation,…
Achieving Hierarchy-Free Approximation for Bilevel Programs With Equilibrium Constraints
Jiayang Li, Jing Yu, Boyi Liu +2
In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating…
Differentiable Bilevel Programming for Stackelberg Congestion Games
Jiayang Li, Jing Yu, Qianni Wang +3
In a Stackelberg congestion game (SCG), a leader aims to maximize their own gain by anticipating and manipulating the equilibrium state at which the followers settle by playing a c…
Inducing Equilibria via Incentives: Simultaneous Design-and-Play Ensures Global Convergence
Boyi Liu, Jiayang Li, Zhuoran Yang +4
To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally posse…
End-to-End Learning and Intervention in Games
Jiayang Li, Jing Yu, Yu Marco Nie +1
In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may…