activity
20202025
most citedDifferentiable Bilevel Programming for Stackelberg Congestion Games

3 citations · 7 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

math.OC2025

Cardinality-Constrained Bilevel Capacity Expansion

Lei Guo, Jiayang Li

As a fundamental problem in transportation and operations research, the bilevel capacity expansion problem (BCEP) has been extensively studied for decades. In practice, BCEPs are c…

econ.TH2023

Wardrop Equilibrium Can Be Boundedly Rational: A New Behavioral Theory of Route Choice

Jiayang Li, Zhaoran Wang, Yu Marco Nie

As one of the most fundamental concepts in transportation science, Wardrop equilibrium (WE) has always had a relatively weak behavioral underpinning. To strengthen this foundation,…

math.OC2023★ 2 cited

Achieving Hierarchy-Free Approximation for Bilevel Programs With Equilibrium Constraints

Jiayang Li, Jing Yu, Boyi Liu +2

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating…

cs.GT2022★ 3 cited

Differentiable Bilevel Programming for Stackelberg Congestion Games

Jiayang Li, Jing Yu, Qianni Wang +3

In a Stackelberg congestion game (SCG), a leader aims to maximize their own gain by anticipating and manipulating the equilibrium state at which the followers settle by playing a c…

cs.GT2021★ 2 cited

Inducing Equilibria via Incentives: Simultaneous Design-and-Play Ensures Global Convergence

Boyi Liu, Jiayang Li, Zhuoran Yang +4

To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally posse…

cs.LG2020

End-to-End Learning and Intervention in Games

Jiayang Li, Jing Yu, Yu Marco Nie +1

In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may…