activity
20242026
collaborators

8 papers

econ.TH2026

An axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion

Wataru Kitano, Shohei Yanagita

We develop an axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion where the sender cannot fully control the information available to the receiver. After selecting an information structur…

cs.GT2026

Exploring Relations among Fairness Notions in Discrete Fair Division

Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma

Fair allocation of indivisible items among agents is a fundamental and extensively studied problem. However, fairness does not have a single universally accepted definition, leadin…

cs.GT2026

Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness of the Envy-Cycle-Elimination Algorithm

Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma

We consider the problem of fairly dividing indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. It is known that an Epistemic EFX and -MMS allocation can be obtained using…

cs.GT2026

Revenue-Optimal Pricing for Budget-Constrained Buyers in Data Markets

Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma +1

We study revenue-optimal pricing in data markets with rational, budget-constrained buyers. Such a market offers multiple datasets for sale, and buyers aim to improve the accuracy o…

cs.GT2025

Proportional and Pareto-Optimal Allocation of Chores with Subsidy

Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma, Xiaowei Wu

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible chores among agents with possibly different weights, aiming for a solution that is both fair and efficient. Specifically,…

cs.DS2025

Automating the Search for Small Hard Examples to Approximation Algorithms

Eklavya Sharma

Given an approximation algorithm , we want to find the input with the worst approximation ratio, i.e., the input for which 's output's objective value is the worst possible c…