activity
20202025
most citedBeyond Preferences in AI Alignment

31 citations · 67 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for

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6 papers · 1 filter

cs.AI2025

Model-Free RL Agents Demonstrate System 1-Like Intentionality

Hal Ashton, Matija Franklin

This paper argues that model-free reinforcement learning (RL) agents, while lacking explicit planning mechanisms, exhibit behaviours that can be analogised to System 1 ("thinking f…

cs.AI2024★ 31 cited

Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment

Tan Zhi-Xuan, Micah Carroll, Matija Franklin +1

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizi…

cs.AI2023

Concept Extrapolation: A Conceptual Primer

Matija Franklin, Rebecca Gorman, Hal Ashton +1

This article is a primer on concept extrapolation - the ability to take a concept, a feature, or a goal that is defined in one context and extrapolate it safely to a more general c…

cs.AI2022★ 9 cited

Recognising the importance of preference change: A call for a coordinated multidisciplinary research effort in the age of AI

Matija Franklin, Hal Ashton, Rebecca Gorman +1

As artificial intelligence becomes more powerful and a ubiquitous presence in daily life, it is imperative to understand and manage the impact of AI systems on our lives and decisi…

cs.AI2021★ 1 cited

Definitions of intent suitable for algorithms

Hal Ashton

Intent modifies an actor's culpability of many types wrongdoing. Autonomous Algorithmic Agents have the capability of causing harm, and whilst their current lack of legal personhoo…

cs.AI2021

Extending counterfactual accounts of intent to include oblique intent

Hal Ashton

One approach to defining Intention is to use the counterfactual tools developed to define Causality. Direct Intention is considered the highest level of intent in the common law, a…