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20202024
most citedHCC: A Language-Independent Hardening Contract Compiler for Smart Contracts

7 citations · 8 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for

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6 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2024

Defying the Odds: Solana's Unexpected Resilience in Spite of the Security Challenges Faced by Developers

Sébastien Andreina, Tobias Cloosters, Lucas Davi +5

Solana gained considerable attention as one of the most popular blockchain platforms for deploying decentralized applications. Compared to Ethereum, however, we observe a lack of r…

cs.CR2024

Larger-scale Nakamoto-style Blockchains Don't Necessarily Offer Better Security

Jannik Albrecht, Sebastien Andreina, Frederik Armknecht +3

Extensive research on Nakamoto-style consensus protocols has shown that network delays degrade the security of these protocols. Established results indicate that, perhaps surprisin…

cs.CR2022★ 1 cited

Estimating Patch Propagation Times across (Blockchain) Forks

Sebastien Andreina, Lorenzo Alluminio, Giorgia Azzurra Marson +1

The wide success of Bitcoin has led to a huge surge of alternative cryptocurrencies (altcoins). Most altcoins essentially fork Bitcoin's code with minor modifications, such as the…

cs.CR2022★ 7 cited

HCC: A Language-Independent Hardening Contract Compiler for Smart Contracts

Jens-Rene Giesen, Sebastien Andreina, Michael Rodler +2

Developing secure smart contracts remains a challenging task. Existing approaches are either impractical or leave the burden to developers for fixing bugs. In this paper, we propos…

cs.CR2021

MITOSIS: Practically Scaling Permissioned Blockchains

Giorgia Azzurra Marson, Sebastien Andreina, Lorenzo Alluminio +2

Scalability remains one of the biggest challenges to the adoption of permissioned blockchain technologies for large-scale deployments. Permissioned blockchains typically exhibit lo…

cs.CR2020

BaFFLe: Backdoor detection via Feedback-based Federated Learning

Sebastien Andreina, Giorgia Azzurra Marson, Helen Möllering +1

Recent studies have shown that federated learning (FL) is vulnerable to poisoning attacks that inject a backdoor into the global model. These attacks are effective even when perfor…