activity
20202025
most citedTowards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers

16 citations · 22 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

14 papers

cs.GT2025

Optimal Routing in the Presence of Hooks: Three Case Studies

Tarun Chitra, Kshitij Kulkarni, Karthik Srinivasan

We consider the problem of optimally executing a user trade over networks of constant function market makers (CFMMs) in the presence of hooks. Hooks, introduced in an upcoming vers…

cs.GT2024

Adaptive Incentive Design with Learning Agents

Chinmay Maheshwari, Kshitij Kulkarni, Manxi Wu +1

We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives b…

math.OC2024

Understanding the Impact of Coalitions between EV Charging Stations

Sukanya Kudva, Kshitij Kulkarni, Chinmay Maheshwari +2

The rapid growth of electric vehicles (EVs) is driving the expansion of charging infrastructure globally. As charging stations become ubiquitous, their substantial electricity cons…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

An Analysis of Intent-Based Markets

Tarun Chitra, Kshitij Kulkarni, Mallesh Pai +1

Mechanisms for decentralized finance on blockchains suffer from various problems, including suboptimal price execution for users, latency, and a worse user experience compared to t…

cs.GT2024

Congestion Pricing for Efficiency and Equity: Theory and Applications to the San Francisco Bay Area

Chinmay Maheshwari, Kshitij Kulkarni, Druv Pai +3

Congestion pricing, while adopted by many cities to alleviate traffic congestion, raises concerns about widening socioeconomic disparities due to its disproportionate impact on low…

math.OC2023★ 2 cited

The Specter (and Spectra) of Miner Extractable Value

Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis +1

Miner extractable value (MEV) refers to any excess value that a transaction validator can realize by manipulating the ordering of transactions. In this work, we introduce a simple…

math.OC2023

The Geometry of Constant Function Market Makers

Guillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis +2

Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are the most popular type of decentralized trading venue for cryptocurrency tokens. In this paper, we give a very general geometric framewor…

cs.CR2023★ 1 cited

Attacks on Dynamic DeFi Interest Rate Curves

Tarun Chitra, Peteris Erins, Kshitij Kulkarni

As decentralized money market protocols continue to grow in value locked, there have been a number of optimizations proposed for improving capital efficiency. One set of proposals…

cs.GT2023

Credible, Optimal Auctions via Public Broadcast

Tarun Chitra, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Kshitij Kulkarni

We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to…

stat.ML2022★ 1 cited

Towards Dynamic Causal Discovery with Rare Events: A Nonparametric Conditional Independence Test

Chih-Yuan Chiu, Kshitij Kulkarni, Shankar Sastry

Causal phenomena associated with rare events occur across a wide range of engineering problems, such as risk-sensitive safety analysis, accident analysis and prevention, and extrem…

cs.GT2022★ 16 cited

Towards a Theory of Maximal Extractable Value I: Constant Function Market Makers

Kshitij Kulkarni, Theo Diamandis, Tarun Chitra

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to excess value captured by miners (or validators) from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering user…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

Inducing Social Optimality in Games via Adaptive Incentive Design

Chinmay Maheshwari, Kshitij Kulkarni, Manxi Wu +1

How can a social planner adaptively incentivize selfish agents who are learning in a strategic environment to induce a socially optimal outcome in the long run? We propose a two-ti…

eess.SY2021

Dynamic Tolling for Inducing Socially Optimal Traffic Loads

Chinmay Maheshwari, Kshitij Kulkarni, Manxi Wu +1

How to design tolls that induce socially optimal traffic loads with dynamically arriving travelers who make selfish routing decisions? We propose a two-timescale discrete-time stoc…

cs.MA2020

Social Choice with Changing Preferences: Representation Theorems and Long-Run Policies

Kshitij Kulkarni, Sven Neth

We study group decision making with changing preferences as a Markov Decision Process. We are motivated by the increasing prevalence of automated decision-making systems when makin…