2 citations · 3 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers
Obviously Strategy-Proof Multi-Dimensional Allocation and the Value of Choice
Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which…
Automation and Task Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey
A firm can complete the tasks needed to produce output using either machines or workers. Unlike machines, workers have private information about their preferences over tasks. I stu…
Misperception and informativeness in statistical discrimination
Matteo Escudé, Paula Onuchic, Ludvig Sinander +1
We study the interplay of information and prior (mis)perceptions in a Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type model of statistical discrimination in the labor market. We decompose the effect on av…
Utilitarian Social Choice and Distributional Welfare Analysis
Federico Echenique, Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey
Harsanyi (1955) showed that the only way to aggregate individual preferences into a social preference which satisfies certain desirable properties is ``utilitarianism'', whereby th…
Greedy Allocations and Equitable Matchings
Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey
I provide a novel approach to characterizing the set of interim realizable allocations, in the spirit of Matthews (1984) and Border (1991). The approach allows me to identify preci…
Statistical discrimination and statistical informativeness
Matteo Escudé, Paula Onuchic, Ludvig Sinander +1
We study the link between Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type statistical discrimination and familiar notions of statistical informativeness. Our central insight is that Blackwell's Theorem, s…