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econ.TH2024
Informational Puts
Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, Kei Uzui
We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: s…
econ.TH2024★ 1 cited
Robust Technology Regulation
Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo
We analyze how uncertain technologies should be robustly regulated and how regulation should evolve with new information. An adaptive sandbox comprising a zero marginal tax up to a…
econ.TH2024
Persuasion and Optimal Stopping
Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, Weijie Zhong
We develop a duality-based first-order approach to dynamic persuasion in optimal stopping problems with general action-, state-, and time-dependent preferences. A direct-communicat…