43 citations · 65 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers
SCRAMBLE-CFI: Mitigating Fault-Induced Control-Flow Attacks on OpenTitan
Pascal Nasahl, Stefan Mangard
Secure elements physically exposed to adversaries are frequently targeted by fault attacks. These attacks can be utilized to hijack the control-flow of software allowing the attack…
SFP: Providing System Call Flow Protection against Software and Fault Attacks
Robert Schilling, Pascal Nasahl, Martin Unterguggenberger +1
With the improvements in computing technologies, edge devices in the Internet-of-Things have become more complex. The enabler technology for these complex systems are powerful appl…
EC-CFI: Control-Flow Integrity via Code Encryption Counteracting Fault Attacks
Pascal Nasahl, Salmin Sultana, Hans Liljestrand +5
Fault attacks enable adversaries to manipulate the control-flow of security-critical applications. By inducing targeted faults into the CPU, the software's call graph can be escape…
SCFI: State Machine Control-Flow Hardening Against Fault Attacks
Pascal Nasahl, Martin Unterguggenberger, Rishub Nagpal +3
Fault injection (FI) is a powerful attack methodology allowing an adversary to entirely break the security of a target device. As finite-state machines (FSMs) are fundamental hardw…
SYNFI: Pre-Silicon Fault Analysis of an Open-Source Secure Element
Pascal Nasahl, Miguel Osorio, Pirmin Vogel +4
Fault attacks are active, physical attacks that an adversary can leverage to alter the control-flow of embedded devices to gain access to sensitive information or bypass protection…
SERVAS! Secure Enclaves via RISC-V Authenticryption Shield
Stefan Steinegger, David Schrammel, Samuel Weiser +2
Isolation is a long-standing challenge of software security. Traditional privilege rings and virtual memory are more and more augmented with concepts such as capabilities, protecti…
FIPAC: Thwarting Fault- and Software-Induced Control-Flow Attacks with ARM Pointer Authentication
Robert Schilling, Pascal Nasahl, Stefan Mangard
With the improvements of computing technology, more and more applications embed powerful ARM processors into their devices. These systems can be attacked by redirecting the control…
CrypTag: Thwarting Physical and Logical Memory Vulnerabilities using Cryptographically Colored Memory
Pascal Nasahl, Robert Schilling, Mario Werner +3
Memory vulnerabilities are a major threat to many computing systems. To effectively thwart spatial and temporal memory vulnerabilities, full logical memory safety is required. Howe…
HECTOR-V: A Heterogeneous CPU Architecture for a Secure RISC-V Execution Environment
Pascal Nasahl, Robert Schilling, Mario Werner +1
To ensure secure and trustworthy execution of applications, vendors frequently embed trusted execution environments into their systems. Here, applications are protected from advers…
Pointing in the Right Direction - Securing Memory Accesses in a Faulty World
Robert Schilling, Mario Werner, Pascal Nasahl +1
Reading and writing memory are, besides computation, the most common operations a processor performs. The correctness of these operations is therefore essential for the proper exec…