1 citations · 1 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Persuasion Gains and Losses from Peer Communication
Toygar T. Kerman, Anastas P. Tenev, Konstantin Zabarnyi
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which a sender wants to persuade a critical mass of receivers by revealing partial information about the state to them. The homogeneous bi…
Algorithmic Cheap Talk
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an i…
A Random Dictator Is All You Need
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen +1
We study information aggregation with a decision maker aggregating binary recommendations from symmetric agents. Each agent's recommendation depends on her private information abou…
Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal does not directly observe the agent's effort outcome; rather, she gets a signal about the agent's action ac…
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidl…
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading…
Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Bayesian persuasion is the study of information sharing policies among strategic agents. A prime example is signaling in online ad auctions: what information should a platform sign…