activity
20202024
most citedOn the interplay between pricing, competition and QoS in ride-hailing

2 citations · 2 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

9 papers

econ.TH2024

Equilibrium Cycle: A "Dynamic" Equilibrium

Tushar Shankar Walunj, Shiksha Singhal, Veeraruna Kavitha +1

In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equil…

cs.GT2023

Navigating Resource Conflicts: Co-opetition and Fairness

Shiksha Singhal

In today's dynamic and interconnected world, resource constraints pose significant challenges across various domains, ranging from networks, logistics and manufacturing to project…

cs.IT2023

Social Optimal Freshness in Multi-Source, Multi-Channel Systems via MDP

Shiksha Singhal, Veeraruna Kavitha, Vidya Shankar

Many systems necessitate frequent and consistent updates of a specific information. Often this information is updated regularly, where an old packet becomes completely obsolete in…

math.OC2023★ 2 cited

On the interplay between pricing, competition and QoS in ride-hailing

Tushar Shankar Walunj, Shiksha Singhal, Jayakrishnan Nair +1

We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of pati…

cs.GT2023

On the ubiquity of duopolies in constant sum congestion games

Shiksha Singhal, Veeraruna Kavitha, Jayakrishnan Nair

We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the…

math.OC2022

AoI-Based Opportunistic-Fair mmWave Schedulers

Shiksha Singhal, Veeraruna Kavitha, Sreenath Ramanath

We consider a system with a Base Station (BS) and multiple mobile/stationary users. BS uses millimeter waves (mmWaves) for data transmission and hence needs to align beams in the d…

math.OC2022

Pricing, competition and market segmentation in ride hailing

Tushar Shankar Walunj, Shiksha Singhal, Veeraruna Kavitha +1

We analyse a non-cooperative strategic game among two ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a certain patience level)…

cs.GT2021

Coalition Formation in Constant Sum Queueing Games

Shiksha Singhal, Veeraruna Kavitha, Jayakrishnan Nair

We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the…

cs.GT2020

Cooperative Ressource Sharing With Adamant Player

Shiksha Singhal, Veeraruna Kavitha

Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coa…