activity
20182026
most citedAdversarial Policies: Attacking Deep Reinforcement Learning

90 citations · 206 across the 39 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

40 papers

cs.CR2026

AI Security Leaderboard: Methodology, Results and Minimal Standard

Jasper Timm, Lukas Struppek, Ziwei Xu +12

The AI Security Leaderboard is an independent benchmark that ranks the safeguards of frontier AI models from least to most secure. It tests models against the FARAI Minimal Stan…

cs.CY2026

The 2026 Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities

Stephen Casper, Oskar Galeev, Yoshua Bengio +117

Frontier AI capabilities and autonomy are advancing rapidly. A growing number of real-world incidents make a trusted AI ecosystem essential to embracing AI with confidence. The 202…

cs.AI2026

Scaling Trends for Lie Detector Oversight in Preference Learning

Oskar J. Hollinsworth, Ann-Kathrin Dombrowski, Sam Adam-Day +2

Deceptive behavior in LLMs is costly to monitor and prevent, motivating approaches such as Scalable Oversight via Lie Detectors (SOLiD) (Cundy & Gleave, 2025), which uses lie detec…

cs.CL2026

Evaluating using Mock Tool Calls to Quarantine Untrusted Prompt Inputs

David Gros, Adam Gleave

Large language models must frequently process untrusted inputs, such as judging an answer from another model or running tasks like spam and harm classifiers while under adversarial…

cs.AI2026★ 7 cited

Concept Influence: Leveraging Interpretability to Improve Performance and Efficiency in Training Data Attribution

Matthew Kowal, Goncalo Paulo, Louis Jaburi +6

As large language models are increasingly trained and fine-tuned, practitioners need methods to identify which training data drive specific behaviors, particularly unintended ones.…

cs.CR2026

Exposing the Systematic Vulnerability of Open-Weight Models to Prefill Attacks

Lukas Struppek, Adam Gleave, Kellin Pelrine

As the capabilities of large language models continue to advance, so does their potential for misuse. While closed-source models typically rely on external defenses, open-weight mo…

cs.LG2026

The Obfuscation Atlas: Mapping Where Honesty Emerges in RLVR with Deception Probes

Mohammad Taufeeque, Stefan Heimersheim, Adam Gleave +1

Training against white-box deception detectors has been proposed as a way to make AI systems honest. However, such training risks models learning to obfuscate their deception to ev…

cs.AI2026

Large language models can effectively convince people to believe conspiracies

Thomas H. Costello, Kellin Pelrine, Matthew Kowal +6

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be persuasive across a variety of contexts. But it remains unclear whether this persuasive power advantages accuracy, or if bad acto…

cs.CY2025

The Safety Gap Toolkit: Evaluating Hidden Dangers of Open-Source Models

Ann-Kathrin Dombrowski, Dillon Bowen, Adam Gleave +1

Open-weight large language models (LLMs) unlock huge benefits in innovation, personalization, privacy, and democratization. However, their core advantage - modifiability - opens th…

cs.CR2025

Jailbreak-Tuning: Models Efficiently Learn Jailbreak Susceptibility

Brendan Murphy, Dillon Bowen, Shahrad Mohammadzadeh +4

AI systems are rapidly advancing in capability, and frontier model developers broadly acknowledge the need for safeguards against serious misuse. However, this paper demonstrates t…

cs.AI2025

The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities

Yoshua Bengio, Tegan Maharaj, Luke Ong +84

Rapidly improving AI capabilities and autonomy hold significant promise of transformation, but are also driving vigorous debate on how to ensure that AI is safe, i.e., trustworthy,…

cs.CL2025

STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines

Ian R. McKenzie, Oskar J. Hollinsworth, Tom Tseng +5

Frontier AI developers are relying on layers of safeguards to protect against catastrophic misuse of AI systems. Anthropic and OpenAI guard their latest Opus 4 model and GPT-5 mode…

cs.LG2025

Path Channels and Plan Extension Kernels: a Mechanistic Description of Planning in a Sokoban RNN

Mohammad Taufeeque, Aaron David Tucker, Adam Gleave +1

We partially reverse-engineer a convolutional recurrent neural network (RNN) trained with model-free reinforcement learning to play the box-pushing game Sokoban. We find that the R…

cs.AI2025★ 1 cited

It's the Thought that Counts: Evaluating the Attempts of Frontier LLMs to Persuade on Harmful Topics

Matthew Kowal, Jasper Timm, Jean-Francois Godbout +6

Persuasion is a powerful capability of large language models (LLMs) that both enables beneficial applications (e.g. helping people quit smoking) and raises significant risks (e.g.…

cs.LG2025

Preference Learning with Lie Detectors can Induce Honesty or Evasion

Chris Cundy, Adam Gleave

As AI systems become more capable, deceptive behaviors can undermine evaluation and mislead users at deployment. Recent work has shown that lie detectors can accurately classify de…

cs.CY2025

AI Companies Should Report Pre- and Post-Mitigation Safety Evaluations

Dillon Bowen, Ann-Kathrin Dombrowski, Adam Gleave +1

The rapid advancement of AI systems has raised widespread concerns about potential harms of frontier AI systems and the need for responsible evaluation and oversight. In this posit…

cs.MA2025★ 10 cited

Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI

Lewis Hammond, Alan Chan, Jesse Clifton +41

The rapid development of advanced AI agents and the imminent deployment of many instances of these agents will give rise to multi-agent systems of unprecedented complexity. These s…

cs.CR2024★ 1 cited

Scaling Trends for Data Poisoning in LLMs

Dillon Bowen, Brendan Murphy, Will Cai +3

LLMs produce harmful and undesirable behavior when trained on datasets containing even a small fraction of poisoned data. We demonstrate that GPT models remain vulnerable to fine-t…

cs.LG2024

Scaling Trends in Language Model Robustness

Nikolaus Howe, Ian McKenzie, Oskar Hollinsworth +5

Increasing model size has unlocked a dazzling array of capabilities in modern language models. At the same time, even frontier models remain vulnerable to jailbreaks and prompt inj…

cs.LG2024

Planning in a recurrent neural network that plays Sokoban

Mohammad Taufeeque, Philip Quirke, Maximilian Li +4

Planning is essential for solving complex tasks, yet the internal mechanisms underlying planning in neural networks remain poorly understood. Building on prior work, we analyze a r…

cs.LG2024★ 1 cited

Can Go AIs be adversarially robust?

Tom Tseng, Euan McLean, Kellin Pelrine +2

Prior work found that superhuman Go AIs can be defeated by simple adversarial strategies, especially "cyclic" attacks. In this paper, we study whether adding natural countermeasure…

cs.CL2024

Uncovering Latent Human Wellbeing in Language Model Embeddings

Pedro Freire, ChengCheng Tan, Adam Gleave +2

Do language models implicitly learn a concept of human wellbeing? We explore this through the ETHICS Utilitarianism task, assessing if scaling enhances pretrained models' represent…

cs.CR2023★ 3 cited

Exploiting Novel GPT-4 APIs

Kellin Pelrine, Mohammad Taufeeque, Michał Zając +2

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, rea…

cs.LG2023

STARC: A General Framework For Quantifying Differences Between Reward Functions

Joar Skalse, Lucy Farnik, Sumeet Ramesh Motwani +3

In order to solve a task using reinforcement learning, it is necessary to first formalise the goal of that task as a reward function. However, for many real-world tasks, it is very…