2 citations · 8 across the 30 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers · 1 filter
Efficiency of Generalized Proportional First-Price Auctions Under Auto-bidding
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +4
Auto-bidding is now widely adopted in online advertising platforms, allowing advertisers to specify high-level campaign objectives--such as maximizing total value subject to a retu…
Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +4
We study how much revenue a seller can lose by restricting attention to selling separately or grand bundling, in the setting of a single additive buyer with independent item values…
The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +5
We study Bulow-Klemperer-style competition complexity in two-sided double auctions with unit-demand buyers drawn i.i.d. from and unit-supply sellers drawn i.i.d. from…
Forging Self-Funded Marketplaces among Strategic Agents
Yuan Deng, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan +2
We introduce the problem of designing mechanisms that incentivize strategic agents to form self-funded marketplaces. In our model, if agent exerts effort , they i…
From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +3
Budget-feasible mechanism design is a classic framework introduced by Singer, but there is still a wide gap between existing upper and lower bounds. In this paper, we significantly…
Compensation Design
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +5
We introduce compensation design, the problem of designing payment rules that incentivize high-quality contributions in decentralized environments. Here, a budget-constrained princ…
Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization
Yuan Deng, Amin Karbasi, Vahab Mirrokni +3
We study procurement auctions, where an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of services is measured by a submodular function…
Randomized Truthful Auctions with Learning Agents
Gagan Aggarwal, Anupam Gupta, Andres Perlroth +1
We study a setting where agents use no-regret learning algorithms to participate in repeated auctions. \citet{kolumbus2022auctions} showed, rather surprisingly, that when bidders p…
Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?
Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas +1
We study the problem of selling information to a data-buyer who faces a decision problem under uncertainty. We consider the classic Bayesian decision-theoretic model pioneered by […
How to Sell Information Optimally: an Algorithmic Study
Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas
We investigate the algorithmic problem of selling information to agents who face a decision-making problem under uncertainty. We adopt the model recently proposed by Bergemann et a…
An Efficient -BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization
Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Grigoris Velegkas +1
We consider the black-box reduction from multi-dimensional revenue maximization to virtual welfare maximization. Cai et al. show a polynomial-time approximation-preserving reductio…