6 citations · 11 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
Calibeating Made Simple
Yurong Chen, Zhiyi Huang, Michael I. Jordan +1
We study calibeating, the problem of post-processing external forecasts online to minimize cumulative losses and match an informativeness-based benchmark. Unlike prior work, which…
How Sampling Shapes LLM Alignment: From One-Shot Optima to Iterative Dynamics
Yurong Chen, Yu He, Michael I. Jordan +1
Standard methods for aligning large language models with human preferences learn from pairwise comparisons among sampled candidate responses and regularize toward a reference polic…
Beyond Advertising: Mechanism Design for Platform-Wide Marketing Service "QuanZhanTui"
Ningyuan Li, Zhilin Zhang, Tianyan Long +8
On e-commerce platforms, sellers typically bid for impressions from ad traffic to promote their products. However, for most sellers, the majority of their sales come from organic t…
Mechanism Design for LLM Fine-tuning with Multiple Reward Models
Haoran Sun, Yurong Chen, Siwei Wang +3
Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) to aggregate multiple preferences has attracted considerable research attention. With aggregation algorithms advancing, a potential economi…
Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?
Yurong Chen, Zhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng +1
This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whethe…
Coordinated Dynamic Bidding in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Budgets
Yurong Chen, Qian Wang, Zhijian Duan +4
In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and…
A Scalable Neural Network for DSIC Affine Maximizer Auction Design
Zhijian Duan, Haoran Sun, Yurong Chen +1
Automated auction design aims to find empirically high-revenue mechanisms through machine learning. Existing works on multi item auction scenarios can be roughly divided into Regre…
Learning to Manipulate a Commitment Optimizer
Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Jiarui Gan +1
It is shown in recent studies that in a Stackelberg game the follower can manipulate the leader by deviating from their true best-response behavior. Such manipulations are computat…
Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commitment in Extensive-form Games
Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li
To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the fo…
On the Convergence of Fictitious Play: A Decomposition Approach
Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Chenchen Li +4
Fictitious play (FP) is one of the most fundamental game-theoretical learning frameworks for computing Nash equilibrium in -player games, which builds the foundation for modern…
The Tight Bound for Pure Price of Anarchy in an Extended Miner's Dilemma Game
Qian Wang, Yurong Chen
Pool block withholding attack is performed among mining pools in digital cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin. Instead of mining honestly, pools can be incentivized to infiltrate thei…