6 citations · 6 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging
Martin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl, Matthias Oberlechner
Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theo…
Assignment Markets with Budget Constraints
Eleni Batziou, Martin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl
This paper studies markets where a set of indivisible items is sold to bidders with quasilinear, unit-demand valuations, subject to a hard budget constraint. Without financial cons…
Equilibrium Learning in Combinatorial Auctions: Computing Approximate Bayesian Nash Equilibria via Pseudogradient Dynamics
Stefan Heidekrüger, Paul Sutterer, Nils Kohring +2
Applications of combinatorial auctions (CA) as market mechanisms are prevalent in practice, yet their Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) remain poorly understood. Analytical solutions…