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20192025
most citedGotta Catch 'Em All: Using Honeypots to Catch Adversarial Attacks on Neural Networks

75 citations · 243 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing cs.CRShow all

11 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2025★ 1 cited

On the Feasibility of Poisoning Text-to-Image AI Models via Adversarial Mislabeling

Stanley Wu, Ronik Bhaskar, Anna Yoo Jeong Ha +3

Today's text-to-image generative models are trained on millions of images sourced from the Internet, each paired with a detailed caption produced by Vision-Language Models (VLMs).…

cs.CR2024★ 4 cited

Understanding Implosion in Text-to-Image Generative Models

Wenxin Ding, Cathy Y. Li, Shawn Shan +2

Recent works show that text-to-image generative models are surprisingly vulnerable to a variety of poisoning attacks. Empirical results find that these models can be corrupted by a…

cs.CR2023

A Response to Glaze Purification via IMPRESS

Shawn Shan, Stanley Wu, Haitao Zheng +1

Recent work proposed a new mechanism to remove protective perturbation added by Glaze in order to again enable mimicry of art styles from images protected by Glaze. Despite promisi…

cs.CR2023★ 13 cited

Nightshade: Prompt-Specific Poisoning Attacks on Text-to-Image Generative Models

Shawn Shan, Wenxin Ding, Josephine Passananti +3

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive tr…

cs.CR2023★ 43 cited

Glaze: Protecting Artists from Style Mimicry by Text-to-Image Models

Shawn Shan, Jenna Cryan, Emily Wenger +3

Recent text-to-image diffusion models such as MidJourney and Stable Diffusion threaten to displace many in the professional artist community. In particular, models can learn to mim…

cs.CR2022★ 11 cited

Post-breach Recovery: Protection against White-box Adversarial Examples for Leaked DNN Models

Shawn Shan, Wenxin Ding, Emily Wenger +2

Server breaches are an unfortunate reality on today's Internet. In the context of deep neural network (DNN) models, they are particularly harmful, because a leaked model gives an a…

cs.CR2021

SoK: Anti-Facial Recognition Technology

Emily Wenger, Shawn Shan, Haitao Zheng +1

The rapid adoption of facial recognition (FR) technology by both government and commercial entities in recent years has raised concerns about civil liberties and privacy. In respon…

cs.CR2021★ 11 cited

Poison Forensics: Traceback of Data Poisoning Attacks in Neural Networks

Shawn Shan, Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Haitao Zheng +1

In adversarial machine learning, new defenses against attacks on deep learning systems are routinely broken soon after their release by more powerful attacks. In this context, fore…

cs.CR2021★ 16 cited

A Real-time Defense against Website Fingerprinting Attacks

Shawn Shan, Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Haitao Zheng +1

Anonymity systems like Tor are vulnerable to Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks, where a local passive eavesdropper infers the victim's activity. Current WF attacks based on deep…

cs.CR2020★ 12 cited

Blacklight: Scalable Defense for Neural Networks against Query-Based Black-Box Attacks

Huiying Li, Shawn Shan, Emily Wenger +3

Deep learning systems are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. In particular, query-based black-box attacks do not require knowledge of the deep learning model, but can…

cs.CR2020★ 48 cited

Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models

Shawn Shan, Emily Wenger, Jiayun Zhang +3

Today's proliferation of powerful facial recognition systems poses a real threat to personal privacy. As Clearview.ai demonstrated, anyone can canvas the Internet for data and trai…