3 citations · 6 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 2 filters
Computing Balanced Solutions for Large International Kidney Exchange Schemes When Cycle Length Is Unbounded
Márton Benedek, Péter Biró, Gergely Csáji +3
In kidney exchange programmes (KEP) patients may swap their incompatible donors leading to cycles of kidney transplants. Nowadays, countries try to merge their national patient-don…
Popular Matchings under Preference Variation and an Algorithm for Popular Common Bases with Integral Comparison Margins
Gergely Csáji
Preference information in matching markets may be incomplete, criterion-dependent, or noisy. We study popular and dominant matchings under four forms of preference variation: indep…
Weakly-Popular and Super-Popular Matchings with Ties and Their Connection to Stable Matchings
Gergely Csáji, Frederik Glitzner
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal…
Optimal Capacity Modification for Many-To-One Matching Problems
Jiehua Chen, Gergely Csáji
We consider many-to-one matching problems, where one side consists of students and the other side of schools with capacity constraints. We study how to optimally increase the capac…