27 citations · 60 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
Cycles in Liquid Democracy: A Game-Theoretic Justification
Markus Brill, Rachael Colley, Anne-Marie George +3
A common criticism of liquid democracy within the relevant academic literature is that delegation cycles can occur, seemingly resulting in unused voting power. Yet, practitioners a…
Computing Thiele Rules on Interval Elections and their Generalizations
Dimitris Avramidis, Alexandra Lassota, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin +1
Approval-based committee voting has received significant attention in the social choice community. Among the studied rules, Thiele rules, and especially Proportional Approval Votin…
On Multi-Level Apportionment
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Steven Wijaya
Apportionment refers to the well-studied problem of allocating legislative seats among parties or groups with different entitlements. We present a multi-level generalization of app…
Monotone Randomized Apportionment
José Correa, Paul Gölz, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin +2
Apportionment is the act of distributing the seats of a legislature among political parties (or states) in proportion to their vote shares (or populations). A famous impossibility…
Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice: A Case Study of (Over-)Representation in the Polkadot Blockchain
Niclas Boehmer, Markus Brill, Alfonso Cevallos +3
We provide the first large-scale data collection of real-world approval-based committee elections. These elections have been conducted on the Polkadot blockchain as part of their N…
Anonymous and Copy-Robust Delegations for Liquid Democracy
Markus Utke, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Liquid democracy with ranked delegations is a novel voting scheme that unites the practicability of representative democracy with the idealistic appeal of direct democracy: Every v…
Weighted Envy-Freeness for Submodular Valuations
Luisa Montanari, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong +1
We investigate the fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with possibly different entitlements represented by weights. Previous work has shown that guarantees for additive…
Liquid Democracy with Ranked Delegations
Markus Brill, Théo Delemazure, Anne-Marie George +2
Liquid democracy is a novel paradigm for collective decision-making that gives agents the choice between casting a direct vote or delegating their vote to another agent. We conside…
The Price of Justified Representation
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi +3
In multiwinner approval voting, the goal is to select -member committees based on voters' approval ballots. A well-studied concept of proportionality in this context is the just…
Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Ayumi Igarashi +3
Justified representation (JR) is a standard notion of representation in multiwinner approval voting. Not only does a JR committee always exist, but previous work has also shown thr…
Picking Sequences and Monotonicity in Weighted Fair Division
Mithun Chakraborty, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, which captures, for example, the distribution of ministries among political parti…
Selecting Matchings via Multiwinner Voting: How Structure Defeats a Large Candidate Space
Niclas Boehmer, Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an a…
Margin of Victory in Tournaments: Structural and Experimental Results
Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong
Tournament solutions are standard tools for identifying winners based on pairwise comparisons between competing alternatives. The recently studied notion of margin of victory (MoV)…
Refining Tournament Solutions via Margin of Victory
Markus Brill, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong
Tournament solutions are frequently used to select winners from a set of alternatives based on pairwise comparisons between alternatives. Prior work has shown that several common t…
Approval-Based Apportionment
Markus Brill, Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters +2
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of th…